Imports as Product and Labor Market Discipline by Dobbelaere, Sabien et al.
IZA DP No. 2178
Imports as Product and Labor Market Discipline
Hervé Boulhol
Sabien Dobbelaere
Sara Maioli 
D
I
S
C
U
S
S
I
O
N
 P
A
P
E
R
 S
E
R
I
E
S
Forschungsinstitut
zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study
of Labor
June 2006
 
Imports as Product and 
Labor Market Discipline 
 
 
Hervé Boulhol 
IXIS-CIB and CES, 
University Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne  
 
Sabien Dobbelaere 
Ghent University, LICOS K.U. Leuven 
and IZA Bonn 
 
Sara Maioli 
GEP, University of Nottingham 
 
 
 
 
 
Discussion Paper No. 2178 
June 2006 
 
 
 
IZA 
 
P.O. Box 7240   
53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Phone: +49-228-3894-0  
Fax: +49-228-3894-180   
Email: iza@iza.org
 
 
 
 
Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of the institute. Research 
disseminated by IZA may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy 
positions. 
 
The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center 
and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit 
company supported by Deutsche Post World Net. The center is associated with the University of Bonn 
and offers a stimulating research environment through its research networks, research support, and 
visitors and doctoral programs. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in 
all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research 
results and concepts to the interested public.  
 
IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. 
Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be 
available directly from the author. 
IZA Discussion Paper No. 2178 
June 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Imports as Product and Labor Market Discipline*
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simultaneously estimate mark-up and workers’ bargaining power parameters according to 
sector, firm size and period. We find a significant drop in both the mark-up and the workers’ 
bargaining power in the mid-nineties. In the second stage, we relate our parameters of 
interest to trade variables. Our results show that imports from developed countries have 
significantly contributed to the decrease in both mark-ups and workers’ bargaining power. 
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1 Introduction
Following Levinsohn’s 1993 (JIE) article, many studies have drawn on Hall’s
(1988) approach to estimate price-marginal cost mark-ups and have provided
support for the imports-as-market-discipline hypothesis, i.e. the negative im-
pact of foreign competition on mark-ups (see Harrison, 1994; Krishna and Mitra,
1998; Konings et al., 2001; Kee and Hoekman, 2003 among others). Focus-
ing on the labor side and inspired by Rodrik’s (1997) argument that increased
international trade has weakened the position of the workers, only two stud-
ies (Brock and Dobbelaere, 2006 and Dumont et al., 2006) have investigated
whether stronger import competition has squeezed workers’ bargaining power.
The main purpose of the present contribution is to provide evidence of interna-
tional competition curtailing domestic market power in the product market as
well as in the labor market for UK manufacturing sectors.
Graph 1 displays the evolution in price-cost margins at the UK sector level
since 1970.1 At first sight, there is little evidence of a general decline in price-
cost margins despite a steady increase in openness. In fact, at the aggregated
manufacturing level, the price-cost margin was 9.4% in 1970, 8.2% in 1980,
11.5% in 1990 and 9.2% in 2003. How could we reconcile these trends with the
evidence of the pro-competitive eﬀect of international trade highlighted above?
In short, the eﬀect of trade on the price-cost margin is not limited to its impact
on the mark-up, because the price-cost margin only captures the part of the
rents kept by the firms. Price-cost margins are therefore negatively related
to the workers’ bargaining power and therefore, a weakening of the workers’
bargaining power may counterbalance a decrease in mark-ups.
<Insert Graph 1 about here>
Taking into account labor market imperfections, Borjas and Ramey (1995) pro-
vide evidence of foreign competition exerting a negative impact on wages by
reducing rents in concentrated sectors. However, the finding of lower rents
per se does not mean that the rent-sharing scheme between capital and labor
has changed. More recently, using a matched employer-employee database for
France, Kramarz (2003) shows that outsourcing weakens the bargaining posi-
tion of high-school graduate workers by limiting the availability of alternative
jobs.
The seminal paper by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) draws attention to the
importance of product and labor market interactions. Moreover, OECD studies
(e.g. Brandt et al., 2005) point out that product and labor market deregulations
are correlated across countries and Spector (2004) suggests that the eﬀects of
these deregulations tend to reinforce each other. Going one step further, endo-
genizing the bargaining regime, Ebell and Haefke (2004) argue that the strong
1Price-cost margin is defined, as in Schmalensee (1989, p.960), as the diﬀerence between
revenue and variable cost over revenue. The variable cost is the sum of the costs of variable
inputs, i.e. labor and materials.
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decline in coverage and unionization in the US and the UK might have been a
direct consequence of product market reforms of the early eighties. Our study
suggests that the trend in UK price-cost margins is the result of the joint decline
in the mark-up and the workers’ bargaining power following increased opening
of the economy, along the lines of Blanchard (1997) for the United States.
We contribute to the literature in diﬀerent ways. We take advantage of a rich
firm-level dataset consisting of 9820 firms in the UK manufacturing industry
covering the period 1988-2003. This enables us to estimate mark-up and work-
ers’ bargaining power parameters simultaneously for 20 sectors split according
to 3 firm size categories and 3 time periods. To our knowledge, investigating the
cross-sectional heterogeneity in the two parameters at this level of disaggrega-
tion has never been carried out for the UK. Whereas previous empirical studies
have tested the imports-as-market-discipline hypothesis either on the product
market or on the labor market, our study bridges the gap by verifying the im-
pact of increased import competition on both mark-ups and workers’ bargaining
power parameters.
We follow a two-stage approach in which we first estimate mark-ups and workers’
bargaining power parameters according to three dimensions (sector, firm size
and time period). Our results point to a significant drop in both parameters in
the mid-nineties. In the second stage, we identify factors explaining mark-ups
and the workers’ bargaining power with a special focus on the pro-competitive
eﬀect of international trade. We find clear evidence of imports from developed
countries having contributed significantly to the decline in both mark-ups and
workers’ bargaining power.
In the remainder, we first describe the theoretical framework and the empirical
strategy (section 2). Section 3 concentrates on the first-stage results. Section 4
discusses the second-stage results where we evaluate the pro-competitive eﬀect
on both mark-ups and the workers’ bargaining power. Section 5 concludes.
2 Methodology
2.1 Theoretical Framework
Theoretically, we rely on the model of Cre´pon et al. (1999, 2002), detailed
further by Dobbelaere (2004). We start from a production function Qit =
ΘitF (Nit, Mit, Kit), where i is a firm index, t a time index, N is labor, M is
material input, K is capital and F (.) is assumed to be homogeneous of degree
one in its arguments. Θit is an index of technical change or ”true” total factor
productivity. The logarithmic diﬀerentiation of the production function gives:
∆qit = εQNit∆nit + ε
Q
Mit
∆mit + εQKit∆kit +∆θit (1)
Each firm operates under imperfect competition in the product market. On the
labor side, we assume that the union and the firm are involved in an eﬃcient
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bargaining procedure with both wages (w) and labor (N) being the subject of
an agreement (McDonald and Solow, 1981). The union is risk neutral and its
objective is to maximize U(wit, Nit) = Nitwit + (N it − Nit)wit, where N it is
union membership (0 < Nit ≤ N it) and wit is the alternative wage (wit ≤ wit).
Consistent with capital quasi-fixity, the firm objective is to maximize its short-
run profit function: π(wit, Nit, Mit) = R(Nit, Mit) − witNit − jitMit, where
Rit = PitQit stands for total revenue. The outcome of the bargaining is the
asymmetric generalized Nash solution to:
max
wit, Nit,Mit
{N itwit+(N it−N it)wit−N itwit}φit {Rit−witNit−jitMit}1−φit
= max
wit, Nit,Mit
{N it(wit−wit)}φit {Rit−witNit−jitMit}1−φit (2)
where φit ∈ [0, 1] represents the workers’ bargaining power.
Maximization with respect to material input gives RM,it = jit, which directly
leads to:
εQMit = µitαMit (3)
with µit =
Pit
CQ,it
and αMit =
jitMit
PitQit
. Maximization with respect to employment
and the wage rate respectively gives the following first-order conditions:
wit = RN,it + φit
·
Rit −RN,itNit − jitMit
Nit
¸
(4)
wit = wit +
φit
1− φit
·
Rit − witNit − jitMit
Nit
¸
(5)
Eq. (5) states that the wage premium over the alternative wage is positively
related to the workers’ bargaining power and to the size of the rents. Solving
simultaneously (4) and (5) leads to an expression for the contract curve: RN,it =
wit. Expressing the marginal revenue of labor as RN,it = RQ,itQN,it =
PitQN,it
µit
and using this expression together with (4) and the expression for the contract
curve, the elasticity of output with respect to employment can be written as:
εQNit = µitαNit − µit
φit
1− φit
(1− αNit − αMit) (6)
with αNit = witNitPitQit . Assuming constant returns to scale
³
εQNit + ε
Q
Mit
+ εQKit = 1
´
,2
the capital elasticity can be expressed as:
εQKit = 1− µitαMit − µitαNit + µit
φit
1− φit
(1− αNit − αMit) (7)
2The asumption of constant returns to scale is motivated by the large problem of identifica-
tion which arises when mark-up and scale elasticity parameters are estimated simultaneously.
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Inserting (3), (6) and (7) in (1) and rearranging terms gives following expression
of the Solow Residual SRit:
SRit ≡ ∆qit − αNit∆nit − αMit∆mit − (1− αNit − αMit)∆kit
= βit (∆qit −∆kit)− γit (1− αNit − αMit) (∆nit −∆kit) (8)
+ (1− βit)∆θit
where βit =
µit−1
µit
is the Lerner index and γit =
φit
1−φit
, strictly increasing
functions of the mark-up and the bargaining power, respectively.
By embedding the eﬃcient bargaining model into a microeconomic version of
Hall’s (1988) framework, the Solow Residual can be broken down into three com-
ponents: (1) a factor representing the Lerner index (βit), (2) a factor reflecting
the relative bargaining power of the workers (γit) and (3) a technological term
(∆θit). Note that estimating mark-ups relying on the original Hall (1988) ap-
proach, assuming allocative wages, generates a downward bias, which increases
with the bargaining power of the workers. Intuitively, this underestimation
corresponds to the omission of the part of product rents captured by the work-
ers (see Dobbelaere, 2004 and Dobbelaere and Mairesse, 2005 for sector-level
evidence in the Belgian and the French manufacturing industry respectively).
2.2 Empirical Framework
To test the imports-as-product-and-labor-market-discipline hypothesis, we fol-
low a two-stage estimation strategy. In the first part, we estimate the reduced-
form equation (8) which allows us to identify our structural parameters of inter-
est, i.e. the price-marginal cost mark-up µˆ and the workers’ bargaining power bφ.
We estimate these parameters for 20 sectors in the UK manufacturing industry,
split according to 3 size categories and 3 time periods. In the second part, our
estimated parameters are regressed on international trade variables to test the
hypothesis that international competition curtails domestic product and labor
market power.
3 Part I : Identifying the parameters of interest
µˆ and bφ
In this section, we first present the data. Second, we outline our empirical
strategy and compare consistently fixed eﬀects (FE) and Generalized Method
of Moments (GMM) estimates of our parameters of interest at the sectoral level
for all firms and all periods. Finally, we conduct a variance analysis along the
three dimensions, sector, firm size and period.
3.1 Data
Our analysis is based on two firm-level surveys: OneSource, which covers the
years 1988-1998, and Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME), which oﬀers a
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coverage for the years 1994-2003.3 We only keep firms within the manufacturing
industry for which we have at least 4 observations for all variables, ending up
with an unbalanced panel of 9820 firms with the number of observations for
each firm varying between 4 and 14.4
We use turnover deflated by the producer price index at the four- and five-digit
level, according to availability,5 as a proxy for output (Q). Labor (N) refers to
the average number of employees in each firm for each year. Intermediate inputs
(M) are calculated by subtracting the value added from the value of production,
deflated by the two-digit materials and fuel price index. The capital stock (K) is
measured by the gross bookvalue of fixed assets deflated by a price index of net
capital defined at the two-digit level. All deflators are drawn from the UK Oﬃce
for National Statistics (ONS). The input shares (αN and αM ) are computed
by dividing respectively the firm total labor cost and undeflated intermediate
inputs by the value of production and by taking the average of these ratios over
adjacent years. Table 1 reports the means, standard deviations and first and
third quartiles of our main variables used in the Part I estimation.6
<Insert Table 1 about here>
We split the total sample into 20 two-digit sectors according to the Standard
Industrial Classification 2003.7 Employment coverage of our sample is on av-
erage 60% of total UK manufacturing employment (SIC 15-37). Table A.1 in
Appendix shows the sector repartition of the sample.
3.2 Empirical Strategy
The main diﬃculty in estimating the extended Hall-type equation (8) lies in the
potential correlation between the TFP-growth term (∆θ) and the RHS vari-
ables. The problem arises because the productivity shocks are unobserved by
the econometrician but not necessarily by the firms which, at least, might antic-
ipate them before choosing their factor inputs. In this case, OLS estimates are
likely to be biased. Moreover, the burgeoning literature on firm heterogeneity
stresses the diﬀerences in productivity level and growth across firms (Bernard et
3OneSource is a database of company accounts constructed by OneSource Information
Services Ltd, whilst FAME is gathered by Bureau Van Dijk Electronic Publishing and both
derive ultimately from the information which companies are required to deposit at Companies
House. For FAME a maximum of 10 years of complete data history can be downloaded at
once. For OneSource we used the CD-ROM entitled ”UK companies, Vol. 1”, October 2000.
Further details on the OneSource dataset can be found in Oulton (1998).
4In OneSource, the holding companies are reported in addition to their subsidiaries. To
avoid the double accounting, we excluded the holdings.
5The PPI is available at the 5-digit level for the period 1990-2000 and at the 4-digit level
for the period 2001-2003.
6Wemade two rounds of cleaning: the first in order to harmonize OneSource with Fame and
to obtain a unique and coherent dataset, and the second to eliminate outliers and anomalies
in the dataset. Details are available upon request.
7We paid attention to the fact that some firms were recorded in two sectors at diﬀerent
times. To create a one-to-one match between firms and sectors, each firm was attributed to
the most recorded sector. Sectors 16 and 23 have been dropped due to parsimonious data.
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al., 2003 for the US and Eaton et al., 2004 for France). As in Harrison (1994),
this problem could be addressed by decomposing the productivity growth term
into a firm and a time fixed eﬀect, the latter capturing possible unobservable
aggregate shocks and productivity shocks common to all firms within sector j,
plus a disturbance term:
uijt =
¡
1− βj
¢
∆θijt = eij + ejt + vijt (9)
However, since inputs and output are simultaneously determined, the fixed-
eﬀects (FE) estimator might still be biased. Taking advantage of the panel
dimension of the data, Eq.(8) can be estimated using the Generalized Method
of Moments (GMM) technique. We use the 3- to 5-year lagged values of the
factor inputs n, m and k as instruments.
3.3 Comparison of FE and GMM estimates
Table 2 reports the FE and GMM8 estimates for each of the 20 sectors.9 For
the GMM estimates, the parameters of interest (µˆj and
bφj , j = 1, ..., 20) are
computed from the two-step estimated values of the reduced-form coeﬃcients
(bβj and bγj respectively). The estimated standard errors (bσ) of the estimated
parameters are computed using the Delta Method (Woolridge, 2002).10
The estimated Lerner index (bβj) is always very significant. The estimated
relative bargaining power of the workers (bγj) is significant for 18 out of the 20
sectors with FE, and this number drops to 10 with GMM. However, average
parameters are very similar, around 0.20 for bβj and 0.70 for bγj , which implies
an average estimated mark-up (µˆj) of 1.25 and an average estimated workers’
bargaining power parameter (bφj) of 0.40 respectively. The latter is above Van
Reenen’s (1996) estimates, lying in (0.22-0.29) range, but is very close to the
UK estimates obtained by Dumont et al. (2006) using a smaller set of firms
and sectors. More specifically, the FE range across sectors is (1.12 - 1.45) for
the estimated mark-up and (0.19 - 0.56) for the estimated workers’ bargaining
power. The GMM specification tests behave well. The overidentification test is
not rejected in all but two sectors. The autocorrelation tests are not rejected
for sixteen sectors.11
It is worth noting that the estimated mark-up (µˆj) and the estimated workers’
bargaining power parameter (bφj) are positively correlated across sectors. The
8The GMM estimation was carried out in Stata 9.1 (Roodman, 2005).
9Note that a considerable share of firms generates negative profits in a given year. For
instance, the sum of the shares of variable factors in output exceeds 1 for 21% of the obser-
vations in our sample, which is not uncommon. In this case, Eq.(8) is not symmetrical as
bargaining does not apply to negative profits. In particular, wages cannot be lower than the
marginal revenue of labor. It follows directly that
¡
1− αNit − αMit
¢
(∆nit −∆kit) in (8)
equals zero when the sum of the variable input shares exceeds one. We also tried to limit the
sample to those observations of which the sum of the variable input factors is lower than 1.05
and found similar results.
10σbµ = σbβ(1−bβ)2 ; σbφ = σbγ(1+bγ)2 .
11Results not reported but available upon request.
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correlation between the two estimated structural parameters is 0.71 for the FE
estimates and 0.53 for the GMM estimates. This is consistent with Abowd and
Lemieux (1993) findings that the bargaining power is positively linked to the size
of the rents, and with Dobbelaere (2004) and Dobbelaere and Mairesse (2005).
Boulhol (2005) suggests that, as capital return is determined by the share of the
rents kept by the firms, an arbitrage reasoning based on capital mobility across
sectors can explain this positive correlation.
<Insert Table 2 about here>
Table 3 compares the FE and the GMM estimates more synthetically. The GMM
estimates are more dispersed across sectors, even leading to two (insignificant)
negative bargaining power parameters. However, the correlation between the
FE and the GMM estimates is strong and significant. For the estimated Lerner
indexes, the Pearson correlation coeﬃcient is close to 0.90 between FE and
GMM. For the estimated relative bargaining power parameters, it reaches 0.57
unweighted and 0.72 when weighted to take into account the precision of the
estimates. This comparison highlights that the FE and the GMM estimates are
very close to each other and suggests that the fixed eﬀects do a good job in ac-
counting for the heterogeneity in productivity growth across firms. Dobbelaere
and Mairesse (2005) reach a similar conclusion. Harrison (1994) shows that her
FE and IV estimates are very close and, consequently, sticks to the FE results
as Levinsohn (1993) does. We follow the same route for the remaining of this
study.
<Insert Table 3 about here>
3.4 Variance Analysis
The above estimates should be considered as sectoral average parameters. There
are, however, many reasons to believe that mark-up and bargaining power pa-
rameters vary across time and firm size. What follows confirms this presump-
tion. In addition to the sectoral dimension, the sample is split according to size
and period criteria. For the former, the sample is divided between small firms
(fewer than 75 employees on average), medium-sized firms (between 75 and 200
employees) and large firms (more than 200 employees), which provides three
sub-samples of comparable size. For the latter, three sub-periods are defined:
1991-1994, 1995-1998, 1999-2003.12 This leaves us with 179 estimates for the
mark-up and the bargaining power parameter: 20 sectors x 3 periods x 3 size
classes, minus sector 19, first period, small firms due to lack of data.
These 179 ”observations” are used in our Part II estimates. Before formally as-
sessing the determinants of the two parameters of interest, we conduct a variance
analysis along the three dimensions presiding over the splitting of the sample.
Each of these Part I estimates is weighted by the inverse of the sampling vari-
ance. 19 out of the 179 Part I estimates display a negative estimated bargaining
12We start in 1991 to allow for lags.
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power. Therefore, as a robustness check, the various results are compared with
and without the 19 ”outliers”.
As for the estimated mark-ups (see the left part of Table 4), the three dimensions
(sector, size and period) are very significant at the 99% confidence level, the
sectoral dimension, as expected, accounting for the larger part of the explained
variance. Two findings show up clearly. First, mark-ups drop significantly
and importantly by around five percentage points between the first and the
second period. Second, the estimated mark-up is increasing in firm size. This is
consistent with both theory (e.g. Cournot competition) and empirical evidence
in the heterogeneous firm literature. The diﬀerence according to firm size is
especially true between the small firms and the others.
The right part of Table 4 reports the variance analysis for the estimated workers’
bargaining power parameters. The sector share of the explained variance is also
predominant. Similar to the estimated mark-up, the workers’ bargaining power
dropped significantly, by around 0.12, after the first period. This decrease in
the workers’ bargaining power echoes Blanchflower and Bryson (2004) who find
a significant decline in the union wage premium after 1994 for the UK. It is also
consistent with the diluted role of UK labor market institutions, documented by
Machin (1997). In addition to other legislative measures, he draws attention to
the abolition of the Wages Council system of minimum wages in August 1993,
covering 2.5 million workers at that time. Moreover, the workers’ bargaining
power is estimated to be lower, by around 0.05, for the smaller firms. However,
this diﬀerence is only significant with the medium-sized firms.13
<Insert Table 4 about here>
4 Part II : Testing the imports-as-product-and-
labor-market-discipline hypothesis
This section concentrates on the identification of the eﬀect of increased import
competition on the estimated mark-ups and workers’ bargaining power param-
eters. Each Part I estimate is weighted by the inverse of the sampling variance.
A description of all variables used in this section and data sources are reported
in table A.2 in Appendix. Our main focus is the impact of international trade
on our two parameters of interest.
4.1 Mark-up
4.1.1 Specification
Firms under intensifying foreign competition are induced to reduce their margins
because of the increase in the perceived elasticity of the demand they are facing.
13When we drop the 19 ”outliers”, we find very similar results.
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This elasticity depends on the elasticity of substitution between varieties, the
concentration level and the intensity of competition.
The following variables are defined. IMPORT is the share of imports in
sectoral demand. Trade theory highlights that the impact of imports is dif-
ferentiated depending on the origin of the imports. For a developed coun-
try like the United Kingdom, trade with developing countries is supposedly
based on comparative advantage and the impact of trade is mainly channelled
through reallocation between sectors. In contrast, trade with developed coun-
tries is mostly intra-industry. It is based on imperfect competition and is
therefore a better candidate for the pro-competitive eﬀect on markups. We
distinguish IMPNORTH, which is the share of imports from Western Eu-
rope, North America, Japan, Australia and New Zealand in total demand, from
IMPSOUTH, its complement. Since firms are likely to select foreign markets
based on the margins they oﬀer for their products, exports could be positively
related to markups. The export ratio at the firm level is EXPFIRM .
The relationship between the intensity of competition and concentration need
not be monotonous. Indeed, Sutton (1991, 1997) insists on the endogeneity
of market structure. An increase in the competitive environment may trigger
an endogenous reaction of firms, through an increase in R&D or advertisement
spending for instance. This might force out firms that are unable to keep the
pace. R&D could hence be positively related to mark-ups. R&DRATIO is
defined as the share of R&D spending in total output at the sectoral level.
There is a lack of data to take into account the change in domestic competition
at the sectoral level. At the country level, we test three variables that might
have an impact on markups. PMR is the product market regulation index
computed by the OECD on a scale from 0 to 6, in ascending order of regulation.
The series is available for 1988, 1993, 1998 (Nicoletti et al., 2001) and 2003
(Conway et al., 2005), and is linearly interpolated between these years.14 For
the UK, it has decreased from 3.5 in 1988 to 1.0 in 2003. The second variable is
the (log of) stock market capitalization as a share of GDP , CAPIT . Hoekman
et al. (2001) provide evidence of stock market capitalization exerting a signifi-
cantly positive impact on average industry mark-ups. They argue that financial
deepening reduces the cost of capital, thus increasing the overal profitability
of the economy. Finally, the Herfindahl index, HERF , is calculated from our
sample. Caution is required using this variable as it is very sensitive to the entry
or exit of big firms in the database at diﬀerent times.
Because of its importance in the drawing up of macroeconomic policies, an abun-
dant literature deals with the cyclicality of mark-ups. Rotemberg and Wood-
ford (1999) provide some detailed theoretical explanations, such as overhead la-
bor, adjustment costs and labor hoarding, in support of the counter-cyclicality
14The indicator is based on seven non-manufacturing sectors (energy, communication and
transport). It is very correlated (linear coeﬃcient of around 86%) to the regulation index for
the whole economy, only available for 1998 and 2003.
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of mark-ups. The debate whether mark-ups are pro- or counter-cyclical re-
mains unresolved although the empirical evidence rather leans towards counter-
cyclicality. We use the annual change in value-added, and V ALUCY C is the
de-trended series using a Hodrik-Prescott filter. Our empirical specification can
be expressed as:
bµjsp= α1Lag(IMPORT jp) + α2Lag(EXPFIRM jsp) + αxXjsp+ej+es+ep+ξjsp
(10)
with j, s and p indexing sector, size and period, respectively.
To overcome the endogeneity problem of trade and other variables, all explana-
tory variables are lagged, except for firm size, the cyclical variable and the
Herfindahl index. We use 3-year lagged values of the endogenous variables. In
order to avoid overlapping between the subperiods, ideally we would need 5-
year lags. However, such a long lag is likely to weaken the explanatory power
substantially and we therefore use it as a robustness check only.
4.1.2 Results
Our results are presented in Table 5. The main result is that imports exert a
negative impact on mark-ups, although this eﬀect is not significant when the
origin of imports is not diﬀerentiated. As column (2) indicates, this is because
only imports from developed countries appear to have a significant eﬀect, which
is consistent with the discussion above. The estimated impact looks strong, as
an increase of one point in the share of imports from the North in total demand
would trigger a decrease of around one point. Kee and Hoekman (2003), Chen et
al. (2004) and Boulhol (2006) found about half the size of this eﬀect, although
without distinguishing between the origin of imports. Note that, compared
to the variance analysis, the explanatory power measured by the adjusted R2
increases from 0.31 to 0.36.
Exports never show up as being significant. Consistent with the heterogenous
firm literature, we find that exports increase with firm size, as the export ratio
is on average 0.065 higher for the large compared to the small firms. However,
it seems that the size-eﬀect on mark-ups is not amplified by the export status.
R&D appears to have a positive eﬀect on mark-ups. Although not always sig-
nificant, the impact is large as one standard deviation in R&DRATIO makes
a diﬀerence of 0.07 in mark-ups. When we substitute the (log of) average em-
ployment to the size dummies or when the sample is restricted to the positive
bargaining power observations, the results are not altered. When time dummies
are withdrawn, the coeﬃcient of the cyclical variable V ALUCY C is negative
and significant, hence supporting the counter-cyclicality of mark-ups.
As a robustness check, we use 5-year lags which produce in general qualitatively
similar -although not always significant- results. As an illustration, we report
in the last column the specification consistent with the one in column (2).
<Insert Table 5 about here>
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4.2 Workers’ Bargaining Power
4.2.1 Specification
Formalizing the impact of foreign competition on workers’ bargaining strength
is not as straightforward as doing so on mark-ups, even if it is generally reflected
in the increase in the elasticity of labor demand due to imports. Rodrik (1997)
points out that imports increase the substitution between domestic and foreign
workers. Moreover pressure from foreign competition could increase the risk of
breakdown in bargaining and loosen labor market tightness, thereby diminishing
workers’ bargaining power (see Brock and Dobbelaere, 2006 and Dumont et
al.,2005 for further discussion and references).
In addition to the variables described in Section (4.1.1), we evaluate the eﬀect
of three labor market variables on workers’ bargaining power: UNIONDENS,
REPLRATE and UNEMPRATE, referring to union density, the replacement
rate and the unemployment rate at the country level respectively. Union density
and the replacement rate are expected to be positively related to the workers’
bargaining power. For the unemployment rate, the link might not be clear-cut.
An increase in the unemployment rate has a negative eﬀect on the outside option,
hence a negative relationship with the workers’ bargaining power is expected.
However, because the union wage premium softens the impact of shocks on
wages, Blanchflower and Bryson (2004) find that the union wage premium is
counter-cyclical, pointing to a positive relationship. Therefore, the resulting
eﬀect is, a priori, ambiguous.
Product market deregulation (PMR) has been found to be positively correlated
to labor market deregulation across countries and seems to precede labor mar-
ket reforms (see Fig. 34 in Brandt et al., 2005). If capital deepening (CAPIT )
is linked to increased capital mobility, it might have a negative impact on the
workers’ bargaining power. Finally, it is often argued that technological change,
instead of international trade, triggers changes in the labor market (see e.g.
Berman et al., 1994; Krugman and Lawrence, 1996). Technological change
(R&DRATIO) might exert an eﬀect on the workers’ bargaining power by im-
pacting the nature of the production process. However, this eﬀect is, a priori,
unclear. As discussed in Betcherman (1991), it depends on the importance
of labor costs in the firm’s total costs and on the workers’ essentiality in the
production process.
To test the imports-as-labor-market discipline hypothesis, we estimate the fol-
lowing specification:
bφjsp= α1Lag(IMPORT jp) + α2Lag(EXPFIRM jsp) + αxXjsp+ej+es+ep+ξjsp
(11)
with j, s and p indexing sector, size and period, respectively.
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4.2.2 Results
Our results, which are reported in Table 6, provide robust evidence of imports
having squeezed the workers’ bargaining power. When the origin is taken into
account, this impact is only significant for imports from developed countries.
An increase of one point in the share of imports from the North seems to have
reduced the bargaining power by 0.08 on average.15 The fact that only increased
import competition from the North exerts a significantly negative impact might
seem surprising at first sight. However, one would need to rely on a more
detailed skill structure within sectors to have a clearer analysis. Our results
seem to point out that, because of similar characteristics in terms of educa-
tion, productivity and skills, foreign workers in developed countries are more
substitutable through imports to UK workers than those in developing coun-
tries. Interestingly, Neven and Wyplosz (1999) find similar eﬀects. In addition,
the coeﬃcient on EXPFIRM is positive and significant at 10% for a few
specifications.
Because most of the other explanatory variables lack the sectoral dimension,
we run into severe multicollinearity issues. This makes it almost impossible to
disentangle the eﬀect of these country variables. Therefore, we test each of them
separately, keeping in mind that the contribution of each variable should not be
cumulated. The impact of UNIONDENS, PMR, REPLRATE, CAPIT
and UNEMPRATE show up significantly. The first two variables have the
highest explanatory power. De-unionization seems to be associated with a de-
cline in the workers’ bargaining power between 1991 and 2003. Product market
and labor market deregulation are found to go hand in hand. A higher unem-
ployment rate, a lower replacement rate and financial deepening seem negatively
related to the workers’ bargaining power. Finally, the workers’ bargaining power
is found to be significantly higher in concentrated sectors whereas no significant
relationship is detected with R&D.16
<Insert Table 6 about here>
5 Conclusion
Many empirical studies have provided evidence that trade has a pro-competitive
eﬀect by reducing mark-ups to marginal cost in import competing industries.
Most of them have focused on developing countries assuming a perfectly compet-
itive labor market. In contrast, this study concentrates on a developed country
and takes into account labor market imperfections, using firm-level data for
UK manufacturing sectors. Our results indicate that both the mark-ups and
workers’ bargaining power decreased in the mid-nineties. Moreover, imports
15Considering 5 EU countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the UK), Dumont et
al. (2006) find a comparable eﬀect.
16As a robustness check, limiting ourselves to the 160 non-negative bargaining power Part
I estimates produces similar results. Also, we used a logarithmic transformation. The results,
which are available upon request, confirm our previous findings.
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from developed countries are shown to contribute significantly to these changes,
whereas firm exports have a weakly significant positive influence on the workers’
bargaining power. These joint eﬀects imply that trade has exerted a conflicting
impact on price-cost margins, i.e. on the share of the rents kept by the firms.
We also find, consistent with the recent literature on firm heterogeneity, that
small firms have lower mark-ups. Additionally, their workers are subject to a
lower bargaining power.
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Appendix
Table A.1
Sector repartition of the sample
Code Name
15 Food products and beverages
17 Textiles
18 Wearing apparel, dressing, dying of fur
19 Leather, leather products and footwear
20 Wood and products of wood and cork
21 Pulp, paper and paper products
22 Printing and publishing
24 Chemicals and chemical products
25 Rubber and plastic products
26 Other non-metallic mineral products
27 Basic metals
28 Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment
29 Machinery and equipment, n.e.c.
30 Oﬃce, accounting and computing machinery
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus, n.e.c.
32 Radio, television and communication equipment
33 Medical, precision and optical instruments
34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
35 Other transport equipment
36 Manufacturing, n.e.c.
Table A.2
Description and source of variables in Part II regressions
Variable Description Source
CAPIT
Log of stock market capitalization
as a percentage of GDP
Datastream
EXPFIRM Firm exports/turnover ratio OneSource, FAME
HERF Sample-based Herfindahl index OneSource, FAME
IMPORT
Sectoral import penetration ratio:
imports/(imports+production-exports)
STAN
IMPNORTH
IMPORT from Western Europe, North America,
Japan, Australia and New Zealand
Bilateral Trade Database (OECD)
IMPSOUTH Complement of IMPNORTH Bilateral Trade Database (OECD)
PMR Product market regulation index Conway et al. (2005)
R&DRATIO Sectoral share of R&D expenses in total output OECD
UNEMPRATE Country-level unemployment rate Nickell and Nunziata (2001)
UNIONDENS Manufacturing-level union density Nickell and Nunziata (2001)
REPLRATE Manufacturing-level replacement rate Nickell and Nunziata (2001)
VALUCYC De-trended sectoral annual change in value added STAN
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Graph 1 
Price-cost margins for large UK manufacturing sectors (description in A.1 in Appendix) 
1970-2003, STAN database 
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Table 1
Summary statistics
Variables 1990-2003
Mean Sd. Q1 Q3 N
Real firm output growth rate ∆q 0.014 0.166 -0.081 0.107 60579
Labor growth rate ∆n 0.003 0.129 -0.061 0.062 60579
Capital growth rate ∆k 0.006 0.178 -0.090 0.088 60579
Intermediate inputs growth rate ∆m 0.029 0.189 -0.084 0.138 60579
Share of labor in nominal output αN 0.287 0.130 0.192 0.369 60579
Share of intermediate inputs in nominal output αM 0.656 0.137 0.567 0.752 60579
Solow residual SRa 0.0008 0.079 -0.037 0.037 60579
∆q −∆k 0.007 0.219 -0.116 0.137 60579
(αN + αM − 1) (∆n−∆k) 0.0002 0.019 -0.005 0.005 60579
a SR = ∆q − αN∆n− αM∆m− (1− αN − αM )∆k.
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Table 2
Sector analysis: Estimated sector-level mark-up µˆj and workers’ bargaining power φˆj , FE and GMM results
FIRM FIXED EFFECTS GMM
Code
# Obs.
(# Firms)
βˆj µˆj = 11−bβj bγj φˆj = bγj1+bγj βˆj µˆj = 11−bβj bγj φˆj = bγj1+bγj
15 3893 (787) 0.195∗∗∗ (0.008) 1.242∗∗∗ (0.012) 0.670∗∗∗ (0.120) 0.401∗∗∗ (0.043) 0.198∗∗∗ (0.032) 1.247∗∗∗ (0.050) 0.350 (0.441) 0.259 (0.242)
17 1957 (377) 0.178∗∗∗ (0.010) 1.216∗∗∗ (0.014) 1.137∗∗∗ (0.165) 0.532∗∗∗ (0.036) 0.211∗∗∗ (0.037) 1.267∗∗∗ (0.059) 1.679∗∗∗ (0.543) 0.627∗∗∗ (0.076)
18 834 (192) 0.111∗∗∗ (0.012) 1.124∗∗∗ (0.015) 0.420∗ (0.254) 0.296∗∗∗ (0.126) 0.134∗∗∗ (0.027) 1.155∗∗∗ (0.036) 0.022 (0.711) 0.022 (0.681)
19 432 (74) 0.103∗∗∗ (0.019) 1.115∗∗∗ (0.023) 0.238 (0.371) 0.192 (0.242) 0.101∗∗∗ (0.036) 1.112∗∗∗ (0.045) 1.272∗ (0.680) 0.560∗∗∗ (0.132)
20 948 (213) 0.145∗∗∗ (0.016) 1.170∗∗∗ (0.022) 0.597∗∗ (0.268) 0.374∗∗∗ (0.105) 0.076∗∗∗ (0.021) 1.082∗∗∗ (0.246) -0.302 (1.840) -0.433 (3.777)
21 1565 (306) 0.197∗∗∗ (0.013) 1.246∗∗∗ (0.019) 0.841∗∗∗ (0.145) 0.457∗∗∗ (0.043) 0.213∗∗∗ (0.037) 1.271∗∗∗ (0.060) 1.155∗∗∗ (0.274) 0.536∗∗∗ (0.059)
22 4824 (1120) 0.187∗∗∗ (0.007) 1.230∗∗∗ (0.011) 0.244∗∗∗ (0.075) 0.196∗∗∗ (0.048) 0.191∗∗∗ (0.035) 1.236∗∗∗ (0.053) 0.316 (0.287) 0.240 (0.166)
24 4061 (781) 0.235∗∗∗ (0.009) 1.308∗∗∗ (0.015) 0.821∗∗∗ (0.104) 0.451∗∗∗ (0.031) 0.209∗∗∗ (0.038) 1.264∗∗∗ (0.051) 1.171∗∗ (0.460) 0.539∗∗∗ (0.098)
25 3194 (612) 0.200∗∗∗ (0.009) 1.250∗∗∗ (0.014) 0.455∗∗∗ (0.107) 0.313∗∗∗ (0.050) 0.212∗∗∗ (0.034) 1.269∗∗∗ (0.055) 0.066 (0.358) 0.062 (0.315)
26 1607 (305) 0.236∗∗∗ (0.016) 1.309∗∗∗ (0.027) 0.978∗∗∗ (0.174) 0.494∗∗∗ (0.044) 0.253∗∗∗ (0.056) 1.339∗∗∗ (0.100) 0.552 (0.476) 0.356∗ (0.198)
27 1779 (337) 0.186∗∗∗ (0.0110) 1.329∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.733∗∗∗ (0.192) 0.423∗∗∗ (0.064) 0.210∗∗∗ (0.033) 1.266∗∗∗ (0.053) 1.385∗∗ (0.566) 0.581∗∗∗ (0.100)
28 5061 (1115) 0.190∗∗∗ (0.007) 1.235∗∗∗ (0.011) 0.442∗∗∗ (0.109) 0.306∗∗∗ (0.053) 0.175∗∗∗ (0.034) 1.212∗∗∗ (0.050) -0.231 (0.264) -0.300 (0.446)
29 5417 (1101) 0.198∗∗∗ (0.006) 1.247∗∗∗ (0.010) 0.829∗∗∗ (0.100) 0.453∗∗∗ (0.030) 0.225∗∗∗ (0.031) 1.290∗∗∗ (0.052) 0.869∗ (0.507) 0.465∗∗∗ (0.145)
30 563 (142) 0.179∗∗∗ (0.018) 1.219∗∗∗ (0.026) 0.523∗∗∗ (0.202) 0.344∗∗∗ (0.087) 0.159∗∗∗ (0.037) 1.189∗∗∗ (0.052) 0.179 (0.251) 0.152 (0.181)
31 2181 (475) 0.273∗∗∗ (0.012) 1.375∗∗∗ (0.023) 1.228∗∗∗ (0.147) 0.551∗∗∗ (0.030) 0.318∗∗∗ (0.043) 1.466∗∗∗ (0.092) 1.046∗∗ (0.451) 0.511∗∗∗ (0.108)
32 1393 (325) 0.309∗∗∗ (0.015) 1.448∗∗∗ (0.032) 1.289∗∗∗ (0.211) 0.563∗∗∗ (0.040) 0.390∗∗∗ (0.041) 1.639∗∗∗ (0.110) 1.316∗∗∗ (0.467) 0.568∗∗∗ (0.087)
33 2155 (478) 0.222∗∗∗ (0.012) 1.285∗∗∗ (0.019) 0.637∗∗∗ (0.148) 0.389∗∗∗ (0.055) 0.210∗∗∗ (0.033) 1.266∗∗∗ (0.053) 0.252 (0.488) 0.201 (0.311)
34 1682 (320) 0.193∗∗∗ (0.012) 1.239∗∗∗ (0.019) 0.807∗∗∗ (0.223) 0.447∗∗∗ (0.068) 0.269∗∗∗ (0.026) 1.368∗∗∗ (0.049) 1.526∗∗∗ (0.486) 0.604∗∗∗ (0.076)
35 847 (205) 0.234∗∗∗ (0.015) 1.306∗∗∗ (0.026) 0.951∗∗∗ (0.188) 0.488∗∗∗ (0.049) 0.230∗∗∗ (0.026) 1.299∗∗∗ (0.044) 0.807∗∗ (0.368) 0.447∗∗∗ (0.113)
36 2468 (555) 0.173∗∗∗ (0.009) 1.210∗∗∗ (0.013) 0.627∗∗∗ (0.136) 0.385∗∗∗ (0.051) 0.174∗∗∗ (0.031) 1.211∗∗∗ (0.045) 0.265 (0.414) 0.209 (0.259)
Sector average 0.197 (0.012) 1.250 (0.018) 0.723 (0.172) 0.403 (0.065) 0.208 (0.044) 1.272 (0.068) 0.685 (0.517) 0.310 (0.378)
SRit = ∆qit − αNit∆nit − αMit∆mit − (1− αNit − αMit)∆kit
= β (∆qit −∆kit)− γ (1− αNit − αMit) (∆nit −∆kit) + (1− β)∆θit
Time dummies are included but not reported. FE: robust standard errors in parentheses.
GMM: robust standard errors with finite-sample correction for the two-step covariance matrix (Windmeijer, 2005).
∗∗∗ Significant at 1%; ∗∗ Significant at 5%; ∗ Significant at 10%.
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Table 3
Correlation between FE and GMM estimates
Correlation FE-GMM
Mean Sd. Min Max Unweighted Weight 1 Weight 2bβj FE 0.197 0.048 0.103 0.309 0.89∗∗∗ 0.85∗∗∗ 0.86∗∗∗
GMM 0.208 0.069 0.076 0.390bγj FE 0.723 0.298 0.238 1.289 0.57∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗
GMM 0.685 0.611 -0.302 1.679
Weight 1: 1bσ2FE , weight 2: 1bσFEbσGMM
Table 4
Variance analysis
Mark-up µˆjst Barg. power
bφjst
PERIOD (ref: 1991-1994)
1995-1998
-0.053∗∗∗
(0.019)
-0.120∗∗∗
(0.019)
1999-2003
-0.048∗∗
(0.020)
-0.126∗∗∗
(0.020)
SIZE (ref: small firms)
Medium-sized
0.047∗∗∗
(0.012)
0.055∗∗
(0.021)
Large
0.049∗∗∗
(0.016)
0.029
(0.021)
R2 0.310 0.573
# Obs. 179 179
SHARE OF EXPL. VARIANCE
Sector 73%∗∗∗ 71%∗∗∗
Period 11%∗∗∗ 26%∗∗∗
Size 16%∗∗∗ 3%∗∗
∗∗∗ Significant at 1%; ∗∗ Significant at 5%; ∗ Significant at 10%.
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Table 5
Determinants of estimated price-cost mark-up µˆjsp
Variables (1)
a
(2)
a
(3)
a
(4)
a
(5)
a
(6)
a
(7)
b
1995-1998
-0.040∗
(0.024)
-0.053∗∗
(0.024)
-0.054∗∗
(0.024)
-0.064∗∗
(0.025)
1999-2003
-0.023
(0.023)
-0.021
(0.023)
-0.019
(0.023)
-0.037∗
(0.022)
Medium-sized
0.046∗∗∗
(0.012)
0.044∗∗∗
(0.012)
0.044∗∗∗
(0.012)
Large
0.050∗∗∗
(0.017)
0.051∗∗∗
(0.017)
0.051∗∗∗
(0.017)
Log(N)
0.017∗∗∗
(0.005)
0.017∗∗∗
(0.005)
0.017∗∗∗
(0.005)
0.017∗∗∗
(0.005)
VALUCYC
-0.042
(0.210)
0.021
(0.205)
0.011
(0.200)
-0.308∗∗
(0.143
-0.339∗∗
(0.144)
-0.320∗∗
(0.144)
0.040
(0.206)
lag(EXPFIRM)
-0.064
(0.182)
-0.102
(0.183)
-0.123
(0.185)
-0.117
(0.184)
-0.122
(0.182)
-0.117
(0.184)
-0.137
(0.185)
lag(IMPORT)
-0.278
(0.323)
lag(IMPNORTH)
-1.133∗∗∗
(0.376)
-1.181∗∗∗
(0.371)
-0.877∗∗
(0.353)
-0.989∗∗
(0.379)
-0.942∗∗
(0.398)
-1.372∗∗∗
(0.386)
lag(IMPSOUTH)
0.254
(0.334)
0.257
(0.336)
0.314
(0.324)
0.196
(0.324)
0.326
(0.326)
0.799∗
(0.418)
lag(R&DRATIO)
4.369∗
(2.483)
3.663
(2.221)
3.687∗
(2.205)
3.659
(2.243)
3.578
(2.264)
3.420
(2.335)
2.561
(2.014)
lag(PMR)
0.013
(0.013)
0.013
(0.013)
lag(CAPIT)
-0.007
(0.026)
HERF
-0.095
(0.205)
Sector dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.321 0.357 0.351 0.336 0.332 0.332 0.358
#Obs. 179 179 179 179 179 179 179
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗Significant at 1%; ∗∗Significant at 5%; ∗Significant at 10%.
a 3-year lags used.
b 5-year lags used except for EXPFIRM . For this variable, we are forced to take 3-year lags because of data availability
in the first sub-period.
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Table 6
Determinants of the estimated workers’ bargaining power bφjsp
Variables (1)a (2)a (3)a (4)a (5)a (6)a (7)a (8)b (9)b (10)b
1995-1998
-0.112∗∗∗
(0.020)
-0.109∗∗∗
(0.020)
-0.115∗∗∗
(0.021)
1999-2003
-0.108∗∗∗
(0.024)
-0.108∗∗∗
(0.025)
-0.119∗∗∗
(0.026)
Medium-sized
0.049∗∗
(0.022)
0.048∗∗
(0.021)
0.045∗∗
(0.025)
0.061∗∗∗
(0.025)
Large
0.015
(0.025)
0.016
(0.024)
0.011
(0.032)
0.036
(0.032)
Log(N)
-0.005
(0.006)
-0.004
(0.006)
0.0005
(0.006)
-0.002
(0.006)
-0.002
(0.006)
0.001
(0.006)
lag(EXPFIRM)
0.284
(0.184)
0.297
(0.194)
0.378∗
(0.206)
0.370∗
(0.208)
0.235
(0.206)
0.348∗
(0.210)
0.344
(0.210)
0.343∗
(0.198)
0.200
(0.205)
0.256
(0.212)
lag(IMPORT)
-0.376∗∗
(0.179)
lag(IMPNORTH)
-0.850∗∗
(0.352)
-0.655∗
(0.383)
-0.665∗
(0.393)
-1.539∗∗∗
(0.328)
-0.817∗
(0.415)
-0.836∗∗
(0.417)
-0.476
(0.510)
-0.935∗
(0.522)
-1.020∗∗
(0.508)
lag(IMPSOUTH)
0.211
(0.288)
0.327
(0.299)
0.303
(0.314)
-0.416
(0.347)
0.140
(0.369)
0.117
(0.373)
0.189
(0.396)
-0.768
(0.476)
-0.733
(0.543)
lag(R&DRATIO)
-2.041
(2.098)
-1.688
(2.079)
-1.305
(2.111)
-1.359
(2.160)
-2.040
(2.033)
-1.612
(2.313)
-1.653
(2.326)
-0.107
(1.967)
-1.517
(2.298)
-1.481
(2.288)
lag(PMR)
0.072∗∗∗
(0.014)
lag(UNIONDENS)
1.384∗∗∗
(0.289)
lag(UNEMPRATE)
-2.281∗∗∗
(0.691)
REPLRATE
3.795∗∗∗
(1.058)
lag(CAPIT)
-0.115∗∗∗
(0.033)
HERF
0.274∗
(0.156)
0.390∗∗
(0.173)
0.408∗∗
(0.179)
0.292
(0.186)
0.449∗∗
(0.197)
0.451∗∗
(0.199)
0.321∗∗
(0.155)
0.501∗∗
(0.215)
0.536∗∗
(0.215)
Sector dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.575 0.581 0.553 0.546 0.524 0.521 0.519 0.573 0.492 0.473
#Obs. 179 179 179 179 179 179 179 179 179 179
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗Significant at 1%; ∗∗Significant at 5%; ∗Significant at 10%.
a 3-year lags used.
b 5-year lags used except forEXPFIRM . For this variable, we are forced to take 3-year lags because of data availability in the first subperiod.
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